Quick Answer: A complaint for an offence under Section 56 of the Foreign Exchange Regulation Act, 1973 (FERA) cannot be filed, and a Magistrate cannot take cognizance of it, unless the accused was first given the opportunity notice required by the proviso to Section 61(2). The Supreme Court quashed FERA complaints filed in 2002 against Standard Chartered Bank because no such notice was ever produced or dated, and because the complainant's own inaction had kept the case at the summons stage for over two decades. It also held that a Section 482 CrPC petition cannot be rejected merely because a revision under Section 397 was available.
In Standard Chartered Bank v. Enforcement Officer, Ministry of Home Affairs & Anr. (2026 INSC 727), the Supreme Court held that service of an opportunity notice under the proviso to Section 61(2) of FERA is mandatory, that the burden lies on the prosecution to show at the threshold that it was issued and served, and that the Magistrate must be satisfied of it before taking cognizance (paras 21–23). A Bench of Justice J.B. Pardiwala and Justice Manoj Misra also held that the High Court erred in treating the availability of revision as a bar to Section 482 CrPC, and that the appellant's right to a speedy trial under Article 21 was violated by the complainant's persistent inaction (paras 14, 30–34).
Status: Bombay High Court judgment dated 22.03.2012 in Criminal Application Nos. 182-183 of 2012 set aside; complaints in Criminal Case Nos. 1503-1504 of 2002 and summoning order dated 30.05.2002 quashed qua the appellant only; appeals allowed (paras 35–36).
Headnote: FERA Opportunity Notice and Speedy Trial
Foreign Exchange Regulation Act, 1973 – Sections 56(1), 61(2) proviso, 73(3) – Opportunity notice to show permission – Mandatory pre-condition to complaint and cognizance – Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 – Sections 397 and 482 – Alternative remedy of revision no bar to inherent jurisdiction – Constitution of India – Article 21 – Right to speedy trial – Delay attributable to prosecution – Quashing of complaint and summoning order.
Held: (i) The availability of a revision under Section 397 CrPC does not, by itself, bar the High Court's inherent jurisdiction under Section 482; nomenclature is not decisive and one may be treated as the other (para 14).
(ii) The High Court's threshold view on maintainability was the organising premise of its order, and the dismissal could not be read as resting on delay alone (para 15).
(iii) Service of an opportunity notice under the proviso to Section 61(2) of FERA is mandatory; without it no complaint under Section 56 or 57 can validly be instituted and no Magistrate can validly take cognizance (para 21).
(iv) The opportunity must be meaningful; the burden is on the prosecution to establish at the threshold that the notice was issued and served in the prescribed manner, and the Magistrate must satisfy himself of it before cognizance (para 21).
(v) Where the complaint merely asserted service of a notice, without its date, copy or proof of service, and the claim of non-service was never denied, cognizance and summons could not be sustained (paras 22–23).
(vi) Where delay is caused by the prosecution's persistent inaction, continuation of the proceedings violates the right to speedy trial under Article 21 (paras 30–34).
(paras 14–35)
Case Details: Standard Chartered Bank v. Enforcement Officer (2026 INSC 727)
Final Outcome: Appeals allowed; High Court judgment set aside; complaints in Criminal Case Nos. 1503-1504 of 2002 and the summoning order dated 30.05.2002 quashed as against the appellant only; copy of judgment to be circulated to all High Courts.
Case: Standard Chartered Bank v. Enforcement Officer, Ministry of Home Affairs & Anr.
Neutral Citation: 2026 INSC 727
Case No.: Criminal Appeal Nos. 2142-2143 of 2013
Court: Supreme Court of India (Criminal Appellate Jurisdiction) – Reportable
Date of Decision: 21 July 2026
Bench: Justice J.B. Pardiwala (author) and Justice Manoj Misra
Relevant Acts & Sections: Foreign Exchange Regulation Act, 1973 – Sections 33(2), 56(1), 57, 61(2) and 73(3); Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 – Sections 397, 401, 482 and 483; Constitution of India – Article 21
Impugned Order: Judgment dated 22.03.2012 of the Bombay High Court in Criminal Application Nos. 182-183 of 2012, declining to quash the complaints and summons (para 1)
Counsel: Mr. Shyam Divan, Senior Advocate, for the appellant; Ms. Ruchi Kohli, Senior Advocate, for the respondents (paras 4, 7)
Source: Supreme Court of India
Key Holdings of the Supreme Court
- Availability of revision under Section 397 CrPC is no bar to a petition under Section 482 CrPC (para 14).
- The opportunity notice under the proviso to Section 61(2) of FERA is a mandatory pre-condition to a complaint and to cognizance (para 21).
- The prosecution must prove issue and service of the notice at the threshold; the Magistrate must record satisfaction before cognizance (para 21).
- Cognizance without any notice on record, dated or proved, cannot be sustained (paras 22–23).
- Persistent inaction of the complainant for over two decades violated the appellant's right to speedy trial (paras 30–34).
Brief Facts of the Case
Standard Chartered Bank, an authorised dealer in foreign exchange, was accused of contravening FERA in handling remittances routed through the Vostro account of its London branch maintained with its Mumbai branch. Banker's cheques and drafts procured in India through proxy purchasers were allegedly credited for the onward benefit of a person resident outside India. The bank later reversed the credits and surrendered Rs. 30,00,000 under a directive under Section 33(2) of FERA (para 2).
Complaints in Criminal Case Nos. 1503-1504 of 2002 under Sections 56(1) and 73(3) of FERA were filed on 30.05.2002 for transactions of 1991-1992, and cognizance was taken and summons issued the same day (paras 1, 4, 30).
The summons were not collected by the complainant for about two years. From 2004 to 2012 service was not effected on the accused, save the bank whose counsel appeared on 16.08.2005, and an application for a non-bailable warrant was moved only on 28.05.2012 (paras 30–31).
The bank's petitions under Section 482 CrPC were dismissed by the Bombay High Court on 22.03.2012, which held them not maintainable as revision was available, while terming the delay deplorable and directing the trial to be concluded within one month, later extended to six months. The complainant still remained absent (paras 1, 15, 31–33).
Issues Before the Supreme Court
- Whether the availability of revision under Section 397 CrPC bars a petition under Section 482 CrPC (paras 9, 10–15).
- Whether non-compliance with the opportunity notice requirement in the proviso to Section 61(2) of FERA warrants quashing of the complaints and summoning order (paras 16–23).
- Whether the appellant's right to speedy trial under Article 21 was violated (paras 24–33).
Court's Findings and Reasoning
Section 482 and revision (paras 10–14): Following Dhariwal Tobacco, Prabhu Chawla and Akanksha Arora, the two provisions operate in distinct spheres; the inherent power is limited only by self-restraint, and a High Court may treat a Section 482 petition as a revision rather than non-suit a party on a hyper-technical ground.
High Court's order rested on maintainability (para 15): The respondents' plea that the High Court decided on delay alone was rejected; the impugned order framed all ten applications around their filing without first seeking revision, and its observation on delay was made in continuation of that view.
Opportunity notice mandatory (paras 16–21): Reviewing Delhi High Court decisions in Devashis Bhattacharya, Sanjay Malviya, United India Airways and Shilpi Modes, the Court held that the notice is a mandatory and meaningful requirement, given FERA's drastic penal consequences, and the prosecution must prove its issue and service.
Non-compliance in this case (paras 22–23): The complaints only stated that a notice was served, without its date or a copy. Despite this Court's order of 24.03.2015 permitting additional documents, no notice or proof of service was produced, and the bank's claim of non-receipt was never denied. The Magistrate took cognizance without recording satisfaction, and the High Court ignored the issue.
Speedy trial principles (paras 25–29): Under A.R. Antulay, reaffirmed in P. Ramachandra Rao, the first question is who is responsible for the delay, and courts apply a balancing test. Kailash Chandra Kapri held that keeping an accused in suspended animation for decades is incompatible with Article 21.
Delay laid at the complainant's door (paras 30–33): The record showed persistent and unexplained inaction by the complainant: summons uncollected for two years, no steps for eight years, refusal to collect notices even after the High Court's time-bound directions, and continued absence. This could not be explained as systemic delay and reflected unwillingness to prosecute.
Final Outcome and Directions
- Complaints in Criminal Case Nos. 1503-1504 of 2002 and the summoning order dated 30.05.2002 quashed as against the appellant only (para 35).
- Appeals allowed and the High Court's judgment set aside (para 36).
- Pending applications disposed of; Registry to circulate a copy of the judgment to all High Courts (paras 37–38).
Legal Principle Laid Down
The proviso to Section 61(2) of FERA is a mandatory pre-condition: no complaint under Section 56 or 57 can be instituted, and no Magistrate can take cognizance, unless the accused has been given a meaningful opportunity to show that he had the required permission, and the prosecution bears the burden of proving the issue and service of that notice at the threshold. The availability of revision under Section 397 CrPC does not oust the High Court's inherent jurisdiction under Section 482, and where prolonged delay is attributable to the prosecution's own inaction, the proceedings may be quashed for violation of Article 21 (paras 14, 21, 30–34).
Precedents Relied Upon
- Dhariwal Tobacco Products Ltd. v. State of Maharashtra, (2009) 2 SCC 370 – Relied upon – revisional remedy no bar to Section 482 CrPC. Discussed at para 11.
- Prabhu Chawla v. State of Rajasthan, (2016) 16 SCC 30 – Relied upon – no total ban on inherent powers; limitation is self-restraint. Discussed at para 12.
- Akanksha Arora v. Tanay Maben, 2024 SCC OnLine SC 3688 – Relied upon – nomenclature immaterial; petition may be converted. Discussed at para 13.
- Devashis Bhattacharya v. Union of India, 2009 SCC OnLine Del 1018 – Relied upon – Section 61(2) opportunity must be meaningful and is mandatory. Discussed at para 17.
- Sanjay Malviya v. R.K. Rawal, CEO, Enforcement Directorate, 2015 SCC OnLine Del 7686 – Relied upon – complaint without date or proof of service of notice; cognizance quashed. Discussed at para 18.
- United India Airways Ltd. v. Chief Enforcement Officer, Enforcement Directorate, 2018 SCC OnLine Del 8233 – Relied upon – Magistrate must be satisfied that opportunity was granted. Discussed at para 19.
- Shilpi Modes v. Directorate of Enforcement, 2023 SCC OnLine Del 6816 – Relied upon – notice never served; proceedings quashed. Discussed at para 20.
- Abdul Rehman Antulay v. R.S. Nayak, (1992) 1 SCC 225 – Relied upon – right to speedy trial and the balancing test. Discussed at paras 25–27.
- P. Ramachandra Rao v. State of Karnataka, (2002) 4 SCC 578 – Relied upon – reaffirmed the A.R. Antulay guidelines. Discussed at para 28.
- Kailash Chandra Kapri v. State of Uttar Pradesh, 2026 SCC OnLine SC 858 – Relied upon – proceedings pending for decades quashed under Article 21. Discussed at paras 29 and 34.
Important Paragraphs of the Judgment
Verbatim extracts from the judgment. For the full text, refer to the judgment PDF below.
Para 14: "The availability of an alternative remedy of revision under Section 397 of the CrPC does not, by itself, operate as a bar to the exercise of the inherent jurisdiction of the High Court under Section 482 of the CrPC."
Para 21: "Thus, the conspectus of the above discussion is that the service of an opportunity notice under the proviso to Section 61(2) of FERA is a mandatory requirement, without compliance of which no complaint under Section 56 or 57 of FERA respectively, can validly be instituted, and no Magistrate can validly take cognizance of the offence alleged therein."
Para 21: "The burden lies upon the prosecution to establish, at the threshold, that such notice was issued and served in the prescribed manner."
Para 23: "In such circumstances, applying the principles laid down in the decisions discussed above, we are of the considered opinion that the mandatory requirement of the proviso to Section 61(2) of FERA has not been complied with in the present case, giving rise to violation of principle of natural justice, and therefore, the order of the Magistrate taking cognizance of the complaints and issuing summons to the appellant, having been passed without satisfaction of this mandatory pre-condition, cannot be sustained in law."
Para 33: "Such conduct, persisting even after two express directions of the High Court fixing outer time-limits for completion of the trial, cannot be explained away as systemic delay or administrative constraint."
Para 34: "It is pertinent to mention that 23-years have now elapsed since the institution of the complaint, and over three decades since the transaction it concerns, without the trial having progressed beyond the stage of service of summons."
Practical Impact of the Ruling
- For banks and authorised dealers: Legacy FERA prosecutions can be challenged where the complaint does not show a dated, served opportunity notice under Section 61(2) (paras 21–23).
- For the Enforcement Directorate: Proof of issue and service of the opportunity notice must accompany the complaint; a bare assertion will not do (paras 21–22).
- For Magistrates: Satisfaction about compliance with the proviso to Section 61(2) must be recorded before taking cognizance (paras 21–22).
- For High Courts: Section 482 petitions should not be dismissed solely because revision lies; a petition may be treated as a revision instead (paras 13–14).
- For accused in stale prosecutions: Where the prosecution itself has stalled the case for years, Article 21 can justify quashing (paras 30–34).
FAQs on FERA Opportunity Notice and Speedy Trial
1. What did the Supreme Court decide in Standard Chartered Bank v. Enforcement Officer?
It quashed the 2002 FERA complaints and summoning order against the bank and set aside the Bombay High Court's judgment (paras 35–36).
2. Is the opportunity notice under Section 61(2) of FERA mandatory?
Yes. Without it no complaint under Section 56 or 57 can validly be filed and no Magistrate can validly take cognizance (para 21).
3. Who must prove that the notice was served?
The prosecution, at the threshold, by showing issue and service in the prescribed manner (para 21).
4. Can a Section 482 petition be dismissed because revision is available?
No. Availability of revision under Section 397 is not by itself a bar, and the High Court may treat one as the other (para 14).
5. Why was the right to speedy trial held violated?
Because the complainant itself failed to collect and serve summons for years and remained absent even after the High Court's time-bound directions (paras 30–33).
Keywords: 2026 INSC 727, Standard Chartered Bank v. Enforcement Officer, FERA, Foreign Exchange Regulation Act 1973, Section 61(2) proviso, opportunity notice, Section 56 FERA, cognizance, Section 482 CrPC, Section 397 CrPC, alternative remedy, speedy trial, Article 21, A.R. Antulay, Kailash Chandra Kapri, Dhariwal Tobacco, Prabhu Chawla, Enforcement Directorate, Justice J.B. Pardiwala, Justice Manoj Misra, Supreme Court judgment
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Download Judgment PDF – Standard Chartered Bank v. Enforcement Officer
Source: Supreme Court of India (official website).